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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

No. 15551

FREDRICK WILLIAM ALBERT,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment of guilty after
defendant pleaded guilty to one count of theft, a Class A
misdemeanor in the Fourth Judicial District Court of the
State of Utah in and for Duchesne County, the Honorable Allen
B. Sorensen, Judge.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks to have this case dismissed or,
in the alternative, to order the district court to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and set the matter for
trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant, Fredrick William Albert, was charged
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

with the crime of theft, a Class A misdemeanor, as defined in
Section 76-6-412(l)(c), Utah Code Annotated (1953).

The in-

formation alleges that on or about the 5th day of August, 1977,
the defendant did commit the crime of theft as defined in Section 76-6-604, Utah Code Annotated (1953) in Roosevelt,
Duchesne County, State of Utah.
On the 26th day of October, 1977, the defendant came
before the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge, for the purposes
of arraignment.

At the time of the arraignment the defendant

was without representation of counsel.

Apparently the defen-

dant could not meet his selected counsel's retainer fee,

so

selected counsel refused to accompany the defendant to the
arraignment.
to as Tr.)

(Transcript of proceedings hereinafter referred
(Tr. 1, 2.)

The defendant attempted to enter a guilty plea without representation of counsel, but the Court refused to entertain the plea without defendant being represented by counsel.
The prosecuting attorney then asked the Court, "If
they confer with counsel today, may this come back on at the
end of the calendar?"

(Tr. 2.)

At that time an attorney who happened to be in the
courtroom came forward and agreed to represent the defendant.
After a short conference, the matter came before the Court
again.
plea.

Whereupon the Court accepted the defendant's guilty
The guilty plea was accepted without personally
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addressing the defendant to determine if the plea was voluntary or if the defendant understood the consequences of his
guilty plea.

The relevant portions of the transcript read

as follows:
THE COURT: Let the record show.
Mr. Albert you may enter a plea
to this charge now or you have a
right to additional time to think
it over. What is your request as
to the entry of plea?
MR. ALBERT:
I will make my plea
today, Your Honor.
THE COURT: To the charge contained in the information what is
your plea?
MR. ALBERT:

Guilty, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Were these the same
transactions?
MR. DRANEY:

Yes, Your Honor.

MR. MANGAN:

Yes.

THE COURT:
I take it?
MR. ALBERT:

You were with Mr. Mach
Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Did you hear the
questions I asked him about his
wishes to enter a plea of guilty?
MR. ALBERT:

Yes, sir, I did.

THE COURT: Would any of your
answers to those questions be any
different?
MR. ALBERT:

No, sir.
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THE COURT: The court finds the
defendant is voluntarily offering to enter a plea of guilty
and directs the clerk to enter
that plea.
The defendant came before the Court on the 22nd day
of November, 1977, for the pronouncement of judgment and
sentence.

The Court announced that the judgment would be a

six-month confinement in the Duchesne County Jail.
The defendant filed his notice of appeal on the 23rd
day of November, 1977.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE
AN INQUIRY TO THE DEFENDANT PERSONALLY
AS TO THE VOLUNTARINESS OF HIS GUILTY
PLEA AND TO DETERHINE THAT THE DEFENDA~TT
UNDERSTOOD THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA.
The defendant came before the trial court for the
purpose of entering a guilty plea.

The trial judge did not

personally inquire of the defendant if he understood the consequences of his plea or if the plea was voluntary.

He merely

asked if the defendant heard the questions he had asked to a
Mr. Mach who had been arraigned just prior to the defendant
on the same charge who had also pleaded guilty, and if the
defendant would change any of his answers.
This does not conform with the requirements for the
determination of the voluntariness or the requirement to
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inquire as to the defendant's understanding of the consequences of his guilty plea, as required by the United States
Supreme Court in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238.

In that

case the Supreme Court held that as constitutional requirement, the court must inquire into the constitutional rights
involved.

The Court stated:
Several federal constitutional
rights are involved in a waiver
that takes place when a plea of
guilty is entered in a state
criminal trial.
First, is the
privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination guaranteed
by the Fifth Amendment and
applicable to the States by
reason of the Fourteenth.
Malloa v. Hogan, 378 u.s. 1.
Secon , is the the right to trial
by jury. Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145. Third, is the
right to confront one's accusers.
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400.
We cannot presume a waiver of
these three important federal
rights from a silent record.
What is at stake for an accused
facing death or imprisonment demands the utmost solicitude of
which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the
accused to make sure he has a
full understanding of what the
plea connotes and of its consequence.
When the judge discharges that function, he leaves
a record adequate for any review
that may be later sought . .
In the present case the transcript and record of the
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above defendant's proceeding is silent as to any inquiry by
the trial court to the defendant as to the defendant's understanding of the consequences of his guilty plea or as to its
voluntariness.
The purpose of the Boykin requirement that the trial
judge personally address the defendant concerning his waiver
of his constitutional rights is to insure that the defendant
understands the consequences of his plea and to guarantee that
it is voluntary.
The constitutional rights waived by a guilty plea
are far too important to allow a trial judge to expect a defendant to listen to the interrogation of a different defendant in a different action whose outcome does not affect the
outcome of his own case.

The record of the defendant's own

proceeding must reflect that the defendant voluntarily and
understandingly waived his constitutional rights.
The above-entitled court should not be forced to
look into the transcript of an entirely separate proceeding
whose transcript was not ordered by either party to the action
and only available through the action of the trial judge and
should not be included as part of the record on appeal.
The record of the above defendant's proceeding is
silent as to the defendant's understanding of the effects of
his guilty plea or as to its voluntariness.

As the Court said

in Boykin, "We cannot presume a waiver of these three important
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federal rights from a silent record."

(Id. at 243.)

Therefore the defendant prays that his judgment as
in Boykin be reversed or, in the alternative, to order the
district court to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea
and set the matter for trial.
POINT II
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AS A !-'1.ATTER OF

LAW SHOULD ADOPT THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE ACCEPTANCE OF GUILTY PLEAS AS SET
OUT IN FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULE 11 .
The United States Supreme Court in Boykin, supra,
held that when a defendant pleads guilty to a criminal charge
he waives several federal constitutional rights and that
therefore "The question of an effective waiver of a federal
constitutional right in a proceeding is of course governed by
federal standards.

Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 422."

(Id. at 243.)
The appropriate federal standards for the acceptance of guilty pleas and the procedures to safeguard defendant's constitutional rights waived by a guilty plea are set
out in Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11.
In interpreting the effect of the majority opinion
in Boykin, a dissent written by Mr. Justice Harlan points
out:
The court thus in effect fastens
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upon the States, as a matter of
federal constitutional law, the
rigid prophylactic requirements
of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
(Id. at

245.)

-

Therefore, in order to adequately protect the defendant's federal constitutional rights waived by a guilty plea,
the above-entitled court should adopt as a matter of law the
standards for determining voluntariness of a guilty plea and
that defendant understands the consequence of his guilty plea
as set out in Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11.
POINT III
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO
BE REPRESENTED BY ADEQUATE COUNSEL.
The defendant appeared before the Honorable Allen
B. Sorensen, Judge, for arraignment without counsel.

The

counsel defendant had selected to represent him refused to
attend the arraignment because the defendant could not pay his
retainer fee.

The trial judge announced he would not accept

the defendant's plea if he was not

~epresented

announced he would continue the matter.

by counsel and

The prosecuting attor-

neyney thereupon asked the Court, "If they confer with counsel
today, may this come back on at the end of the calendar?" (Tr. 2 ·)
It was then arranged that an attorney who happened to be in the
courtroom would represent the defendant.

(Tr. 3.)

After a brief
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conference, the defendant came back before the Court and a
plea of guilty was entered and accepted as more fully discussed in Point I.
The case of Alires v. Turner, 449 P.2d 241, 22 Utah
2d 118 (1969) facts are remarkably similar to the present
case.

In that case when the defendants came before the

district court for the purposes of arraignment. The judge
appointed an attorney who happened to be in the courtroom at
the time to represent the defendants.

After a brief confer-

ence with the attorney in the judge's chambers, the defendants
entered pleas of guilty.

(See p. 242.)

The Utah Supreme Court held that this was inadequate
counsel and remanded the case for new trial.

In announcing

its position, the Court stated:
The right of an accused to have
counsel as assured by Sec. 12,
Art. I, Utah Constitution, and
by the VI and XIV Amendments to
the U. S. Constitution is one of
those rights "rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people" as essential to the protection of individual liberties
and therefore included in our
concept of due process of law.
The requirement is not satisfied
by a sham or pretense of an
appearance in the record by an
attorney who manifests no real
concern about the interests of
the accused.
The Court then held:
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The failure of such representation for the petitioner herein
is a departure from due process
of law.
(Id. at 243.)
The Fifth Circuit in Windom v. Cook, 423 F.2d 721
(1970) held that where a court-appointed counsel's only conference with defendant came just prior to the arraignment
proceeding at which the guilty plea was entered, lasted for a
period of between fifteen and thirty minutes and did not discuss the elements of the crimes charged (id., at 721) with
the defendants, that such representation constituted inadequate counsel.
Therefore in the present case where defendant's
counsel was unaware of the facts of the case or any defenses
available to the defendant, who had no real concern about the
interests of the defendant and only conferred with the defendant for a few short moments before representing the defendant
and aiding him in his plea of guilty, does not satisfy the
requirements that defendant be assured counsel as guaranteed
by Section 12, Article I of the Utah Constitution and the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

The representation of the defendant in this case con-

stituted a sham or at best a pretense of an appearance of
representation of counsel in the record and therefore violates
the defendant's right to due process of law and right to
counsel, necessitating that the above court dismiss the
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action against the defendant or, in the alternative, to order
the district court to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty
plea and to set the matter for trial.
CONCLUSION
The trial court improperly accepted defendant's
plea of guilty by failing to inquire of the defendant personally whether or not he understood the consequences of his
guilty plea or if his plea was voluntary.

The record of this

defendant's proceeding is silent as to any inquiry made by
the trial judge to this defendant and is therefore error, for
the Court cannot assume voluntary waiver of the constitutional
rights involved by a guilty plea from a silent record.
(Boykin.)
In order to adequately protect that the constitutional rights waived in a plea of guilty are knowing and voluntary, the above court should adopt the requirements of
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11 as a matter of
law, as required by Boykin.
Further, the defendant was denied constitutional
right to counsel by the trial court allowing an attorney who
happened to be in the courtroom, who had no knowledge or
interest in defendant's case, and who only met with the defendant for a few moments before the defendant entered his
guilty plea to advise and represent the defendant in entering
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his guilty plea.
As a result of the above infringements of the defendant's constitutional rights as guaranteed by the Utah Constitution and the United States Constitution, the above court
should dismiss the case against the defendant or, in the alternative, to order the district court to allow the defendant to
withdraw his guilty plea and set the matter for trial.
Respectfully submitted,
AND HAHSEN
250 East Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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